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A REMEDY FORECLOSED? MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE AND THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Richard D. Gage*
During the Global Financial Crisis, millions of homeowners received
foreclosure notices. Many of these notices were sent by attorneys, and
informed consumers of an impending mortgage foreclosure. Courts are
split on whether foreclosures must conform with the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). In order to be subject to the FDCPA, an entity
must meet the statutory definition of “debt collector.” Courts struggle with
whether foreclosure attorneys fall under this definition. This Note examines
this conflict, and suggests a fact-sensitive framework for evaluating
whether foreclosure attorneys are debt collectors.
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INTRODUCTION
Three attorneys—Smith, Jones, and Rogers1—practice at separate firms
in one of the many states that allow both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure.2 Each has as his primary business the enforcement of
mortgages through the process of nonjudicial foreclosure. In order to
comply with the state’s nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, each attorney
sends an identical foreclosure notice to every homeowner.3 The foreclosure
notices do not verify the debt,4 and do not contain the mini-Miranda
warning5 required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act6 (FDCPA).
They also never demand repayment in the notice.
Although the attorneys have similar practices and use identical
nonjudicial foreclosure notices, there are some differences in how each
attorney runs his practice. Smith’s sole practice area is nonjudicial
foreclosure. His notices only inform consumers of the pending nonjudicial
1. Attorneys Smith, Jones, and Rogers and their law practices are entirely fictitious.
2. For a discussion on the difference between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure, see
infra Part I.B.2.
3. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
4. See infra Part I.A.1.
5. See infra Part I.A.1.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006).
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foreclosure sale. In addition to his nonjudicial foreclosure practice, Jones
also does a non-trivial amount of traditional debt collection (e.g., mail
dunning letters) on a consistent basis. Finally, Rogers’s practice also
includes a consistent, non-trivial amount of judicial foreclosure that always
includes a demand for a deficiency judgment, but he otherwise does not
demand payment from consumers.
Several recipients of these notices realize that they have colorable claims,
and file three distinct class actions against Smith, Jones, and Rogers for
FDCPA violations. However, there is a circuit split regarding whether
foreclosure attorneys are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA.7 Are Smith,
Jones, and Rogers “debt collectors”?
This Note answers this question, and advocates a consistent framework to
analyze different requirements under the FDCPA.8 Part I of this Note
provides background information on the FDCPA, mortgage foreclosure,
and the interplay of the two that has led to the circuit split. Part II explores
the circuit split. Finally, Part III offers a consistent framework for assessing
whether the FDCPA covers mortgage foreclosure.
I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: BACKGROUND ON THE FDCPA AND
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Before analyzing the conflict among the circuits, this Note provides
background information on the FDCPA and mortgage foreclosure. Part I.A
begins with an overview of the FDCPA and explains the areas implicated in
the typical mortgage foreclosure. Next, Part I.B discusses the basics of
mortgages and foreclosure, and examines the differences between judicial
and nonjudicial foreclosure. Finally, Part I.C examines three clauses in the
FDCPA that circuit courts have analyzed in addressing whether mortgage
foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA.
A. The FDCPA’s Purpose and Effect
In deciding whether Smith, Jones, and Rogers fall under the FDCPA,
courts must look at the text of the statute in light of the Act’s history and
7. See Hasbun v. Recontrust Co., No. 11-60488-CIV., 2011 WL 3837158, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 24, 2011) (characterizing the circuit split as between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
on one side, and the Eleventh Circuit on the other); see also Eric M. Marshall, Note, The
Protective Scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Providing Mortgagors the
Protection They Deserve from Abusive Foreclosure Practices, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1269,
1275–81 (2010) (distinguishing circuit courts that had found enforcers of security interests
are debt collectors and district courts that had rejected that view); Alexandra Vozza, Student
Article, The FDCPA’s Application to the Foreclosure Process, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
640, 660 (2012) (concluding that the FDCPA does not apply to mortgage foreclosures). This
Note focuses solely on mortgage foreclosure and thus refers to cases regarding other security
interests only as necessary. This Note characterizes the split as between the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits on one side, and the Eleventh Circuit on the other. See infra Part II.A–B. It also
acknowledges the contribution of the Tenth Circuit in analyzing the issue without resolving
it. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part III.
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purpose. As courts evaluate the text, they will examine typical violations
and defenses under the statute, the defined terms “debt” and “debt
collector,” and the ever-present but undefined “debt collection.” Finally,
courts must also consider how the FDCPA can be best enforced by private
individuals and agencies.
1. General Information
In 1968, Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act9 (CCPA),
which includes the Truth in Lending Act10 (TILA). Although TILA offered
some consumer protections through disclosure requirements for loans,11 it
did not protect consumers from abusive attempts to collect debts.12
Recognizing a “widespread and serious national problem” with abusive
debt collection,13 Congress passed the FDCPA in 197714 to protect
consumers from these abuses,15 and to fill existing gaps in state
protections.16 However, the FDCPA was also meant to be fair to ethical
debt collectors.17

9. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006); see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1615 (2010).
11. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2011) (outlining regulations for extending
credit to consumers). TILA gave the Board of the Federal Reserve System the power to
promulgate rules including model forms. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604.
12. See William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2010)
(indicating that the FDCPA is meant to fill a gap in consumer protection laws left by the
CCPA); see also Presidential Remarks on Signing H.R. 5294 into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1382, 1383 (Sept. 20, 1977) [hereinafter Presidential Remarks] (noting that the
FDCPA was a “great step forward” for consumer protection).
13. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696
(listing particular types of abusive debt collection behavior such as the use of “obscene or
profane language” and the “misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal rights”); see also
Presidential Remarks, supra note 12, at 1382 (noting that protecting consumers from
harassment was a motivating factor for passing the law).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2006)).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) (noting that one purpose of the FDCPA is “to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”); S.
REP. NO. 95-382, at 1, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696–97; Presidential Remarks, supra note 12,
at 1382 (noting examples of consumer harassment provide during the congressional
hearings); see also Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act: A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 762–64
(2005); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 267 (2011).
16. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696–97 (noting that thirteen
states had no debt collection laws at that time); Griffith, supra note 15, at 763.
17. See § 1692(e) (noting that one purpose of the FDCPA is “to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged”); S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696; Marshall, supra note
7, at 1289.
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The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and courts interpret it broadly to
protect consumers that owe, or allegedly owe, a debt.18 The statute
provides rules for debt collectors in their collection efforts,19 and regulates
the way they interact with consumers,20 as well as how they engage in
third-party communications regarding the consumer.21 For instance, a debt
collector may not harass any person,22 engage in unfair practices,23 or use
false or misleading representations in its attempts to collect a debt.24
The FDCPA also requires the debt collector to be forthright with the
consumer about the collector’s efforts. In the debt collector’s initial
communication with the consumer, the debt collector must provide a miniMiranda25 warning to the consumer.26 This warning informs the consumer
that the communication is from a debt collector, and that any information
the consumer provides may be used to collect the consumer’s debt.27
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006); Clark v.
Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002); see also S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4, 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1698 (indicating that the FDCPA uses “general terms” like “harassing,
unfair, or deceptive” to allow courts, “where appropriate, to proscribe other improper
conduct which is not specifically addressed”); Griffith, supra note 15, at 775 n.89 (“The
FDCPA was intended to be broadly remedial.”). The FDCPA defines a consumer as any
person—not a corporation—that owes or allegedly owes a debt. See § 1692a(3) (“[A]ny
natural person . . . .”).
19. See Spector, supra note 15, at 267 (“[The FDCPA] regulates the time and place at
which the collector may communicate with the consumer, the method of communicating,
and the content of the communication.”) (footnotes omitted).
20. See §§ 1692c–1692g; Spector, supra note 15, at 267
21. See § 1692b; Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–93 (1995). Section 1692c(b)
provides that a debt collector may only communicate with third parties (i.e., persons that are
not the consumer, the consumer’s attorney, or a consumer reporting agency) to gain location
information pursuant to § 1692b. See § 1692c(b). Section 1692b provides that debt
collectors may not tell third parties that the consumer is a debtor, see § 1692b(2), or that the
debt collector is in the debt collection business. See § 1692b(5).
22. See § 1692d; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2185, 2229 (2007). Specifically, the debt collector may not use or threaten violence,
see § 1692d(1), use abusive or obscene language, see § 1692d(2), or harass a person on the
telephone—including ringing the phone with intent to harass. See § 1692d(5).
23. See § 1692f; Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending,
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2010).
Unfair practices under this section include the collection of amounts not authorized by the
agreement creating the obligation, see § 1692f(1), and taking or threatening nonjudicial
action to dispossess property when the debt collector has no present right to possession, or
no intention to take possession of the property. See § 1692f(6)(A). The section prohibiting
nonjudicial action also applies to security enforcers. See § 1692a(6). This Note discusses
§ 1692f(6) in detail in Part I.C.1.
24. See § 1692e; Elwin Griffith, The Challenge of Communicating with the Consumer
and Validating the Debt Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
61, 78 (2006). False and misleading representations include: the false representation of the
amount owed, see § 1692e(2)(A), the use of deceptive practices to collect a debt, see §
1692e(10), and the use of a name other than the debt collector’s own. See § 1692e(14).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. See § 1692e(11); Ehrich v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (E.D.N.Y 2010);
see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 563.
27. Compare § 1692e(11) (“[A]ny information obtained will be used [to collect a debt]
. . . .”), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (“The warning of the right to remain silent must be
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The FDCPA also requires a debt collector to validate the consumer’s
debt.28 After the debt collector’s initial communication29 with the
consumer, the debt collector has five days to inform the consumer—in
writing—of the amount of the debt,30 the name of the creditor,31 and of the
consumer’s right to dispute the debt in writing.32 The notice must inform
the consumer that the debt collector must provide verification of a disputed
debt.33 It must also inform the consumer that the consumer’s failure to
dispute the debt allows the debt collector to assume the debt’s validity.34
If the consumer writes to the debt collector within thirty days to dispute
the debt or to request information about the original creditor, the debt
collector must cease collection efforts until she can verify the debt or
provide the original creditor’s information.35 The debt collector does not
need to cease collection efforts until the debt is disputed but may not

accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the
individual in court.”).
28. See § 1692g; Elwin Griffith, The Role of Validation and Communication in the Debt
Collection Process, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2010) (indicating this provision is
meant to inform consumers of their right to dispute the debt and have it verified).
29. Pleadings are not considered an initial communication for the purposes of
§ 1692g(a). See § 1692g(d). This was part of the 2006 amendments to the FDCPA. See
Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802, 120 Stat.
1966, 2004–07 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (2006)). The amendment also
exempts certain required notices that do not relate to debt collection, see § 1692g(e), and
clarifies that debt collection activities could continue in the thirty-day window until the
consumer disputes the debt. See § 1692g(b); see also Colin Hector, Comment, Debt
Collection in the Information Age: New Technologies and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1610 n.56 (2011).
30. See § 1692g(a)(1); Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarity of Language in the Debt
Collection Process: The Impact of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 673, 719 (2008) (explaining the problem of including interest and other costs in debt
calculation).
31. See § 1692g(a)(2); Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception
or Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
3107, 3116 (2010). The notice must also inform the consumer of the right to request and
receive the name and address of the original creditor if different from the current creditor.
See § 1692g(a)(5); Griffith, supra note 28, at 450–51 (discussing how requesting information
regarding the original creditor and disputing the debt are independent of each other).
32. See § 1692g(a)(3)–(5); Griffith, supra note 28, at 433–34.
33. See § 1692g(a)(4); Griffith, supra note 28, at 430.
34. See § 1692g(a)(3); Young Walgenkim, Student Article, Killing “Zombie Debt”
Through Clarity and Consistency in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 65, 75 (2011). However, although the debt is presumed valid, a failure to
dispute is not an admission that the consumer owes the debt. See § 1692g(c). For a
discussion on whether § 1692g(a)(3) includes a writing requirement see Griffith, supra note
30, at 678–81, 732–33, and Griffith, supra note 15, at 798–802.
35. See § 1692g(b); Michael D. Slodov, Documentation? I Don’t Have to Show You
Any Stinkin’ Documentation! An Evaluation of the Verification Requirement of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g(b), 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 156, 158–59 (2011). Slodov’s article also discusses
the three different views regarding what type of verification is required: (1) forms from the
creditor that document the debt; (2) forms that are responsive to the consumer’s dispute or
inquiry; or (3) a declaration confirming the debt without any further documentation. See id.
at 160–68.
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communicate or act in a way that “overshadow[s]” the consumer’s rights to
dispute the debt or obtain information about the original creditor.36
The FDCPA is a strict liability statute that covers both intentional and
unintentional violations.37 This means that the consumer does not need to
show that she was injured, suffered damages, or actually deceived by the
notice.38 Courts agree that the FDCPA protects unsophisticated consumers,
with the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue going even
further, finding that it protects the least sophisticated consumer.39
36. See § 1692g(b); Stueben, supra note 31, at 3117 (clarifying that a debt collector must
go beyond technical compliance to clearly and effectively communicate to the consumer the
consumer’s rights under the FDCPA).
37. See, e.g., Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175–76
(9th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Second and Seventh Circuits); see also Darren W. Ford,
Comment, Secondary Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1079, 1087 (2010) (“[T]he majority of the [FDCPA’s] provisions impose strict liability
on debt collectors.”). But see, e.g., § 1692c(a)(3) (requiring knowledge that the consumer’s
employer prohibits the consumer from receiving communications regarding the collection of
a debt).
38. See Griffith, supra note 30, at 706; Stueben, supra note 31, at 3117 (noting that the
plaintiff need not even read the letter).
39. Compare Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061–62 (9th Cir.
2011) (least sophisticated debtor standard), Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC,
650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) (least sophisticated debtor standard), LeBlanc v. Unifund
CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2010) (least sophisticated consumer
standard), Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 611–12 (6th Cir. 2009) (least
sophisticated consumer standard), Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 309
(2d Cir. 2003) (least sophisticated consumer standard), and United States v. Nat’l Fin.
Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135–36, 139 (4th Cir. 1996) (least sophisticated consumer/debtor
standard), with McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006)
(unsophisticated debtor standard), and Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d
316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004) (unsophisticated consumer standard). The least sophisticated
consumer standard is meant to be lower than the standard for reasonableness, see Gonzales,
660 F.3d at 1061–62; Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008), and is
meant to protect persons specifically targeted for their lower levels of sophistication.
Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the standard protects less sophisticated consumers
“particularly when [they] are targeted by debt collectors”); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d
1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[C]onsumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are
especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes.”). This standard is meant to “ensure that the
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Clomon, 988 F.2d at
1318. However, it is still an objective standard, and it is not enough that the consumer alone
was deceived. See LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194; Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319 (noting that the
least sophisticated consumer standard protects debt collectors from liability for “bizarre or
idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices”). In comparison, the unsophisticated
consumer standard adds an explicit element of reasonableness to clarify that the least
sophisticated standard should not be read literally. See Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27
F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874–75 (8th Cir.
2000). Either way, the bar is low and protects consumers with very low levels of
sophistication. See Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 348 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting the
split but refusing to distinguish between the two standards because the difference between
them is “de minimis”); Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
unsophisticated consumer standard “does not significantly change the substance of the ‘least
sophisticated consumer’ standard as . . . routinely applied by courts.”) (emphasis omitted);
Elwin Griffith, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—Reconciling the Interests of
Consumers and Debt Collectors, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14–16 (1999) (discussing both
standards). Courts have also split regarding whether violations under § 1692e and § 1692g
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A debt collector that violates the FDCPA may raise two defenses to
avoid liability.40 The first is the bona fide error defense,41 which requires a
defendant to show the FDCPA violation “(1) was unintentional; (2) was a
‘bona fide’ error; and (3) occurred despite the existence of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid violations of the FDCPA.”42 However, this
defense is limited to clerical errors and does not apply to mistakes of law.43
The second defense is to show that the action was done in good-faith
compliance with a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advisory opinion.44
However, over the course of ten years only seven requests for guidance
were sent to the FTC and only four advisory opinions have been issued.45
Since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act46
(Dodd-Frank) went into effect on July 21, 2011,47 debt collectors may now
rely on the advisory opinions of the newly created Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB).48
2. Debt, Debt Collectors, and Debt Collection
There are two thresholds that must be met for there to be a violation of
the FDCPA49: (1) the defendant must be a debt collector within the
meaning of the FDCPA;50 and (2) the action or communication must be an
are questions of law or fact, and subsequently whether a judge or jury should decide whether
a violation has occurred. See Stueben, supra note 31, at 3132–49 (examining the split).
40. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605,
1609 (2010); Vartan S. Madoyan, Attorneys Beware: Jerman v. Carlisle Holds You Liable
for Technical Legal Errors Under the FDCPA, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2011).
41. See § 1692k(c); Griffith, supra note 15, at 814.
42. Hepsen v. Resurgent Capital Servs., LP, 383 F. App’x 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also § 1692k(c).
43. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610–11, 1624; see also Madoyan, supra note 40, at 1098–
1104 (discussing the Court’s reasoning in Jerman); Walgenkim, supra note 34, at 87–89.
44. See § 1692k(e); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609.
45. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621; Walgenkim, supra note 34, at 86 (discussing the safe
harbor provision).
46. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 5582 (Supp. V 2011) (providing guidelines for the designated
transfer date); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,253 (Sept. 20, 2010) (notice of the Secretary
of Treasury setting the transfer date as July 21, 2011).
48. Dodd-Frank § 1089 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a, l692k, 1692l, 1692m, and 1692o
by striking “Commission” and inserting “Bureau [of Consumer Financial Protection]”); 76
Fed. Reg. 78,121, 78,122 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (indicating that the CFPB
will adopt additional FDCPA guidelines through regulation rather than advisory opinions).
49. See Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2010)
(providing a two-threshold test); Stagikas v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 129,
138 n.12 (D. Mass. 2011) (same). But see Suquilanda v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, No. 10
Civ. 5868(PKC), 2011 WL 4344044, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2011) (adding whether the
plaintiff is a consumer to create a three part test); Murphy v. Bronson, Cawley, & Bergmann,
LLP, No. 3:10-cv-01929 AJN (RBB), 2011 WL 2413447, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2011)
(same). However, most provisions of the FDCPA apply to any person, not just consumers.
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
50. See Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2003); Izenberg v.
ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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attempt to collect a debt.51 Implicit in both thresholds is that an alleged
debt must exist.52
The FDCPA defines “debt” broadly as “any obligation” that a consumer
has incurred to pay for personal, family, or household expenses.53 The debt
may—but need not—arise out of judgment,54 and courts have interpreted
the term broadly to include various obligations to pay money.55
The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another.”56 Because the debt must be “due
another,” the FDCPA applies to third-party debt collectors, but not

51. See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 400 (3d Cir. 2000); Akalwadi
v. Risk Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (D. Md. 2004).
52. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that whether there is
a debt is a threshold requirement); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367,
1370–71 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he existence of a ‘debt’ [is] a threshold requirement . . . .”).
However, the debt need not be valid. See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th
Cir. 1982).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.
1998). The FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of
“consumer debt”. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006). Most
courts hold that a mortgage on real property is a consumer debt under the Bankruptcy Code.
See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is difficult to conceive of any
expenditure that serves a ‘family . . . or household purpose’ more directly than does the
purchase of a home and the making of improvements thereon.”); In re Lemma, 393 B.R.
299, 301–02 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (gathering cases). But see In re Ikeda 37 B.R. 193, 195
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1984) (finding a mortgage lien was not a consumer debt).
54. See § 1692a(5); Schuh v. Druckman & Sinel, L.L.P., 602 F. Supp. 2d 454, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
55. See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding the use of water services created a debt obligation); Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs.,
163 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the payment of back rent is both the
“payment of a debt” and a “means by which to avoid termination of the lease”). But see
Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny, 664 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding municipal fines
are not debts because they are not derived from a consumer transaction).
56. § 1692a(6).
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creditors.57 Creditors include those who have obtained debts that were not
in default, such as a mortgage service company.58
To satisfy the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” an entity must
either: (1) have debt collection as the principal purpose of its business; or
(2) regularly engage in debt collection.59 A business’s principal purpose is
debt collection if a high proportion of its business is derived from debt
collection,60 and an entity regularly engages in debt collection when it has a
significant volume or consistent frequency of debt collection business.61
Thus, persons engaging in isolated or infrequent debt collection are not debt
collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA.62 For the purposes of one
57. Id.; S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1701
(“‘[D]ebt collector’ is defined to include all third parties who regularly collect consumer
debts for others.”); see also MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 734–35 (6th
Cir. 2007); ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
§ 4.2.5 (6th ed. 2008). There are two caveats: First, a creditor is considered a debt collector
if it uses a name other than its own that would cause a consumer to think that the creditor
was a third party attempting to collect a debt. See § 1692a(6); HOBBS ET AL., supra note 57,
§ 4.2.5. Second, a person is not a creditor—and thus may be a debt collector—under the
FDCPA if it obtains a debt already in default. See § 1692a(4); Hoffman, supra note 12, at
552. Creditors are excluded partly because they are thought to have incentives to “protect
their good will” with consumers when collecting debts because of their potential future
dealings with the consumer. S. REP NO. 95-382, at 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1696; see also Brooks v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 345 F. App’x 260, 262 (9th Cir.
2009); Aubert v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 137 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998).
58. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3–4, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1698 (excluding from the
definition of debt collector “mortgage service companies and others who service outstanding
debts for others, so long as the debts were not in default when taken for servicing”); HOBBS
ET AL., supra note 57, § 4.3.10.
59. See § 1692a(6); see also Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll &
Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing considerations for analysis “relating
to ordinary concepts of regularity”); Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1997)
(noting that they are two distinct prongs).
60. See Oppong v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 215 F. App’x 114, 118–19 (3d Cir. 2007)
(looking to the low proportion of loans acquired in default to find that the defendant did not
meet the principal purpose prong); Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 61 (noting that factors such as the
percentages of “resources devoted to, and revenues derived from” debt collection are more
appropriate for the principal purpose prong, but may be useful for the regularity prong);
Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that an attorney that derived 70 to
80 percent of his legal fees from debt collection met the principal purpose prong).
61. See Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 61–62 (cautioning against blurring the line between the
principal purpose and regularity prongs); Garrett, 110 F.3d at 318 (“[I]f the volume of a
person’s debt collection services is great enough, it is irrelevant that these services only
amount to a small fraction of [the entity’s] business activity; the person still renders them
‘regularly.’”); S. REP NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697–98 (indicating that the
definition of “debt collector” includes those who collect debts “for others in the regular
course of business.”); Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An
Overview Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1996). Goldstein
provides three additional considerations to volume and frequency: (1) whether the entity has
staff devoted to debt collection; (2) whether there are “systems or contractors” to streamline
debt collection; and (3) whether there is an ongoing relationship with a creditor. Goldstein,
374 F.3d at 62–63.
62. See Mertes v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp. 872, 874–75 (W.D. Wisc. 1990) (distinguishing
regular debt collection from occasional debt collection); S. REP NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697–98 (indicating that persons collecting debt “in an isolated instance”
are excluded from the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector”).

2012]

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND THE FDCPA

293

section of the Act, the “debt collector” also includes security enforcers
when they threaten nonjudicial action to dispossess property without a right
or intention to take that property.63
However, there are enumerated exceptions that exclude persons who
otherwise meet the definition of debt collector.64 These exceptions include
(1) persons employed by a creditor;65 (2) persons whose principal business
is not debt collection and who only act as debt collectors for a creditor with
whom they share common ownership;66 (3) employees of the United States
or an individual state acting in their official capacity;67 (4) process servers
attempting to serve legal process in connection with judicial enforcement;68
and (5) bona fide, nonprofit credit counselors.69 The Act also exempts
actions taken that are incidental to a bona fide fiduciary duty.70
In 1986, Congress amended the FDCPA to remove an exemption for
lawyers.71 Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court held in Heintz v.
Jenkins72 that the FDCPA applies to attorneys even when their debt
collection included litigation.73 Since then, most courts that have

63. See §§ 1692a(6), 1692f(6); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1272. This Note refers to this
clause as the security enforcer clause, and this Note discusses it in greater detail in Part I.C.1.
64. See § 1692a(6)(A)–(F); see also S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1698 (indicating that the FDCPA would exclude “the activities of trust departments, escrow
companies, or other bona fide fiduciaries; the collection of debts, such as mortgages and
student loans, by persons who originated such loans” from the definition of “debt collector”).
65. See § 1692a(6)(A); Chad M. Knight, Note, Attorney Liability Under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 85 KY. L.J. 463, 466 (1997).
66. See § 1692a(6)(B); Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, 718 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289–90
(N.D.N.Y 2010) (analyzing the “affiliate” exception).
67. See § 1692a(6)(C); Ezra Ross & Martin Pritkin, The Collection Gap:
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 453, 522 & n.404 (2011) (noting that the government is exempt from the FDCPA).
68. See § 1692a(6)(D); McNall v. Credit Bureau of Josephine Cnty., 689 F. Supp. 2d
1265, 1277–78 (D. Or. 2010) (distinguishing between process servers who act as “mere
messenger[s]” and those that also harass and abuse consumers).
69. See § 1692a(6)(E); Yang v. DTS Fin. Grp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–60 (S.D.
Cal. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled that the defendant was a for-profit
organization and thus may have fallen outside the exception).
70. See § 1692a(6)(F)(i); Davis v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1104,
1108–09 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding that a guaranty agency owed a fiduciary obligation to the
Secretary of Education, and thus fell within the exception). This Note refers to this clause as
the fiduciary obligation clause, and discusses it further in Part I.C.2.
71. An Act to Amend the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100
Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)); see also Heintz, 514 U.S. at
294–95, 299 (holding that attorneys who regularly engage in debt collection are debt
collectors under the FDCPA); H.R. REP. NO. 99-405, at 3–7 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1754–57 (explaining the need to remove the attorney exemption to
protect consumers from the increase in attorney debt collectors). Originally, the FDCPA did
not cover attorneys. See Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874 (1982) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006)); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995).
72. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
73. Id. at 299.
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considered the issue have found that litigation activity, such as discovery,
falls within the FDCPA unless it is expressly exempted.74
In order for a debt collector’s actions to violate the FDCPA, they must be
in “connection with the collection of any debt.”75 However, although the
FDCPA utilizes this phrase—and similar variations76—throughout the
statute, it leaves the specifics of debt collection undefined.77 Without much
guidance from the FDCPA, courts have struggled with whether debt
collection includes mortgage foreclosure, and have so far reached differing
results when confronted with this question.78
3. Agency and Private Enforcement
The FDCPA has two primary enforcers: private persons79 and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).80 For private enforcement, the FDCPA
allows any aggrieved person to sue,81 except for when the statute expressly
limits standing to “consumers.”82 If a violation is found, the aggrieved
74. See § 1692e(11) (“[E]xcept that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading
made in connection with a legal action.”); see also McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg &
Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that service of requests for
admission fell under the FDCPA); Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 228–29,
231–32 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that interrogatories are covered under the FDCPA). But see
Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a complaint fell outside
the FDCPA).
75. See, e.g., §§ 1692a(6), 1692c, 1692d, 1692e, 1692g.
76. Section 1692d uses the similar phrase “collection of a debt,” § 1692d, and § 1692f
uses “collect any debt.” § 1692f. The definition of “communication” also alludes to debt
collection, in that the communication must “convey[] . . . information regarding a debt,”
§ 1692a(2), but the meaning of this phrase is also undefined. See Gillespie v. Chase Home
Fin., LLC, No. 3:09-CV-191-TS, 2009 WL 4061428, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2009);
Mabbitt v. Midwestern Audit Serv., Inc., No. 07-11550, 2008 WL 723507, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 17, 2008).
77. See Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 F. App’x 458, 460 (11th Cir.
2009) (“[T]he FDCPA does not define ‘debt collection.’”); Gray v. Four Oak Court Ass’n,
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The FDCPA does not define ‘the
collection of any debt.’”); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1271 (“The FDCPA . . . vaguely defines
what constitutes debt collection.”).
78. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1271. Compare Brown v. Morris, 243 F. App’x 31, 35
(5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that nonjudicial foreclosure is not per se debt collection), with
McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding
that filing judicial foreclosure is debt collection under the FDCPA).
79. See § 1692k (2006); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130
S. Ct. 1605, 1609 (2010)
80. See § 1692l; see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609.
81. See § 1692k(a) (“[A]ny debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this
subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2003).
82. See, e.g., § 1692c(a) (“[A] debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in
connection with the collection of any debt.”); § 1692e(11) (“[F]ailure to disclose in the
initial written communication with the consumer . . . .”); see also Montgomery, 346 F.3d at
697 (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing under § 1692c because he was not a
consumer); Bank v. Pentagroup Fin., LLC, No. 08-CV-5293 (JG)(RML), 2009 WL 1606420,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y June 9, 2009) (noting and distinguishing both the broad language
encompassing “any person” and limitations set by the use of “consumer.”); Conboy v. AT &
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person is entitled to actual damages,83 up to $1,000 in additional statutory
damages,84 as well as court costs and attorneys’ fees.85 If the suit is a class
action, each named plaintiff is entitled to additional damages of up to
$1,000, and all other class members may be entitled to the lesser of
$500,000 or one percent of the debt collector’s net worth.86 These
recoveries may, however, be limited at the trial court’s discretion. 87
The FTC can also enforce the FDCPA because a violation of the FDCPA
is an unfair or deceptive practice under the Federal Trade Commission
Act88 (FTCA).89 The FTCA allows the FTC to commence litigation for
damages of up to $16,000 per day against debt collectors for intentional
violations of the FDCPA.90 However, the Supreme Court has noted that
there is a potential “enforcement gap” when the law is unsettled, because
consumers would have diminished incentives to bring claims, and the FTC
cannot respond to the thousands of FDCPA complaints each year.91 In fact,
according to a 2009 FTC Report, the FTC only brought sixty actions in the
twenty years since the passage of the FDCPA.92

T Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the language limiting
violations of § 1692e(11) to those communications with consumers).
83. See § 1692k(a)(1); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555
(indicating that actual damages may include emotional distress). Courts must look at the
nature, intent, and frequency of the noncompliance to determine the proper amount of
damages. See § 1692k(b)(1); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. Actual damages for marginal or
technical violations may be zero or close to it. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1620–21; Madoyan,
supra note 40, at 1102.
84. See § 1692k(a)(2)(A); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555
(indicating that there is a split among the circuits regarding whether statutory damages are
calculated per violation or per case).
85. See § 1692k(a)(3); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555. A
winning plaintiff’s attorney is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the
court. See § 1692k(a)(3); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621 & n.16 (citing district court cases that
use the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees); HOBBS ET AL. supra note 57,
§ 6.8.6.1 (defining lodestar as “allowable hours times an appropriate hourly rate” and noting
the “strong presumption” that the lodestar is reasonable); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555.
However, if a plaintiff brings an FDCPA action in “bad faith and for the purpose of
harassment” a court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the defendant.
§ 1692k(a)(3); see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 555.
However, it is unlikely that a court will find bad faith where a circuit has yet to decide an
issue (e.g., whether foreclosure attorneys are debt collectors under the FDCPA). See Jerman,
130 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. See § 1692k(a)(2)(B); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain
and Nothing to Lose” Implications of the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2)
Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 821–22 (2006). Courts will look at the resources of the
debt collector and the number of consumers adversely affected. See § 1692k(b)(2); Knight,
supra note 65, at 473.
87. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1620–21; HOBBS ET AL., supra note 57, at § 6.8.6.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 41–58 (2006).
89. See § 1692l; see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609.
90. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2006); 74
Fed. Reg. 858 (Jan. 9, 2009) (amending 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d)).
91. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1624 (referencing state amici briefs and FTC, COLLECTING
CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009)).
92. FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009).
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Although the FTC has the power to enforce the FDCPA, it lacks rulemaking authority.93 However, the FTC has issued an interpretation of the
FDCPA in a Staff Commentary.94 The Staff Commentary begins by noting
that it is not a trade regulation rule or formal agency action, is not binding,
and does not carry the force of law.95 Thus, with the exception of the Fifth
Circuit,96 courts generally have not given the Staff Commentary Chevron97
deference or treated it as binding law.98 Because courts may still defer to
93. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700 (noting
the FTC’s administrative enforcement authority, but indicating that the FTC lacks rulemaking authority because the FDCPA is comprehensive). However, with the passage of
Dodd-Frank in 2010, Congress empowered the CFPB to engage in rulemaking. See DoddFrank, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092–93 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692a, l692k, 1692l, 1692m, 1692o (2006)); 76 Fed. Reg. 78,121 (Dec. 16, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006); Matthew R. Bremner, Note, The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act: The Need for Reform in the Age of Financial Chaos, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1553, 1592 (2011); Hector, supra note 29, at 1610–11. In December 2011, the CFPB filed
an amicus brief in Birster v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., a case dealing with
mortgage foreclosure and the FDCPA. See Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Birster v. Am.
Home. Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No.11-13574, 2012 WL 2913786 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2011).
94. See Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg 50,097 (Dec. 13, 1988) [hereinafter FTC Staff
Commentary].
95. See id. at 50,101 (noting it “synthesize[s] staff views”); Griffith, supra note 24, at 63
n.11.
96. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (giving the FTC Staff
Commentary Chevron deference in holding that a foreclosure attorney was a debt collector).
97. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984). Chevron outlined a two-part test for reviewing agency interpretation that asks (1)
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue;” and if not, (2)
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. If
Congress gave clear meaning to the statute, then that interpretation governs. See id. at 842.
However, if its meaning is ambiguous, the agency may supply its own interpretation if it is
reasonable. See id. at 844–45. An agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute is given deference by courts. See id.; see also PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 368–70 (2d ed. 2002).
98. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) (declining to give “conclusive weight”
to the Staff Commentary because it was not binding); see also Gulley v. Markoff & Krasny,
664 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the Staff Commentary is entitled to
“respectful consideration” but not Chevron deference); McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls Inc.,
455 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The FTC Commentary is not binding on the courts
because it is not a formal regulation and did not undergo full agency consideration.”);
Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 493 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that
the Staff Commentary lacks the force of law and is therefore not entitled to full Chevron
deference, but accepting the FTC’s interpretation because it was persuasive); Voris v.
Resurgent Capital Servs., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1165 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that the
Staff Commentary was not entitled to Chevron deference). But see Kaltenbach v. Richards,
464 F.3d 524, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the Chevron two part test to the FTC Staff
Commentary); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1372 n.2 (11th Cir.
1998) (citing to Chevron to support the proposition, in dicta, that the Staff Commentary
should be given “considerable weight”); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 1992)
(declining to defer to the FTC interpretation because it conflicted with the plain meaning of
the statute—the first step of the Chevron analysis). With the exception of the Fifth Circuit in
Kaltenbach, the courts that have applied Chevron to the Staff Commentary preceded the
Supreme Court cases that clarified Chevron. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
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the Staff Commentary based on its persuasiveness, this Note refers to the
FTC’s position on certain interpretations.
B. Mortgages and Foreclosures
Beyond the FDCPA, courts must also consider the interplay between
mortgages and foreclosures. The following section looks at the nature and
purpose of each.
1. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust
A mortgage is a type of lien99 securing real property for the payment of a
debt.100 The property—often a home101— is used to satisfy the debt or
obligation in the event of default.102 The mortgagor—or consumer103—
generally has the right of possession.104 Upon default of the loan, a
consumer has the equitable right of redemption—to render payment in
full—and may retain possession of the property until this right is
extinguished through foreclosure.105

226–27 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference is appropriate when Congress delegates
power to the agency “to make rules carrying the force of law”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that certain interpretations “which lack the force of law”
are not entitled to full Chevron deference, but only deference insofar as the interpretation is
persuasive); see also STRAUSS, supra note 97, at 371–75 (discussing Mead).
99. Liens are security interests in property that help ensure payment of a debt or other
obligation. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (9th ed. 2009); LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 21 (6th ed. 2009) (citing the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
MORTGAGES AND LIENS 1 (2004); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2006). Although a
mortgage may secure the performance of any act, the act secured is generally the payment of
a debt. SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8.
100. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 1101–02; SCHMUDDE, supra note
99, at 1; RAY E. SWEAT, MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 17 (1981)
(describing the “modern mortgage”). While a mortgage helps secure satisfaction of the debt,
a note memorializes the underlying debt. See STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., MODERN REAL
ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER 102 (4th ed. 2008) (“[The] note, and not the
mortgage, . . . is the legal evidence of indebtedness.”); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8. The
note memorializes the repayment terms and usually contains an acceleration clause that
allows the creditor to demand full repayment of the loan upon default. See BENDER ET AL.,
supra note 100, at 102.
101. SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 1.
102. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 97 (describing how the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale are distributed); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 2; see also infra Part I.B.2
(discussing foreclosure proceedings to satisfy a debt).
103. This Note will use the term consumer in lieu of mortgagor or debtor to track the
language of the FDCPA.
104. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 95 (describing how the consumer gained the
ability to stay in possession of the mortgaged property); 4 RICHARD J. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY § 37.02 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2011) (describing changes in the
seventeenth century that became modern law).
105. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 96 (providing an account of the evolution of
the equity of redemption to the present day); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.02; see also
infra Part I.B.2 (discussing different procedures for foreclosure).
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There are two broad theories of the rights of a consumer and creditor106
in a mortgage relationship: title theory and lien theory.107 Under title
theory the consumer transfers title to the creditor until the loan is repaid.108
However, although the creditor has title, courts will generally recognize an
express or implied agreement that the consumer retains possession until
foreclosure.109 In contrast, under lien theory, the mortgage is only a lien on
the property, and the consumer retains full title unless and until default and
foreclosure.110 However, most states reach the same results regardless of
what theory is applied,111 with some states utilizing a hybrid theory where
the creditor gains title automatically upon default, but before foreclosure.112
A deed of trust is another type of security interest in property authorized
by some jurisdictions as a substitute for a mortgage.113 A deed of trust
involves a third-party trustee that serves as an intermediary between the
consumer and the creditor for the limited purpose of enforcing the trust.114
The consumer transfers title to the creditor in the deed, which is held by the
trustee until repayment or default.115 If the consumer defaults, the creditor
may exercise the power of sale.116
106. This Note will use the term creditor in lieu of mortgagee to track the language of the
FDCPA.
107. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03 (discussing the evolution from lien theory to
title theory in England and the United States); Peter L. Cockrell, Comment, Subprime
Solutions to the Housing Crisis: Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1155 n.40 (2010).
108. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, at § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7
(indicating there are roughly ten states that still follow this theory).
109. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (indicating
that the creditor “hold[s] title for security purposes only”).
110. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (“[T]he right
to possession arises upon a default.”).
111. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03 (attributing this to “transitional thinking”
from title to lien theory); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7 (“For practical applications there is
usually very little difference between a lien theory and title theory state.”); Julia Patterson
Forrester, Still Crazy After All These Years: The Absolute Assignment of Rents in Mortgage
Loan Transactions, 59 FLA. L. REV. 487, 493–94 (2007) (noting that the differences between
the title, lien, and hybrid theories “may not be so great as they would first appear”).
112. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 7–8; Forrester, supra note 111, at 494 (referring to
the states that follow hybrid theory as “intermediate theory states”); Robyn A. Kowantz,
Note, Property—Landlord-Tenant—The New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act Prohibits Foreclosing
Mortgagees from Evicting Tenants of the Defaulted Mortgagor Without Cause—Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REV.
1292, 1292–93 (1995).
113. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 114 (“[T]here is little practical difference
between a deed of trust and a mortgage . . . .”); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03;
SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8, 89–90.
114. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (“[T]he law regards it not as an actual
trust but as simply another form of security interest.”); 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.03
(noting this trust arrangement is “[u]nlike the usual trust situation” because the title is
transferred to the trustee for a limited purpose—to enforce the trust). Often the trustee is the
creditor’s attorney. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8.
115. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 8. Upon repayment the deed is destroyed and
upon default the deed is transferred to the creditor. See id.
116. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (characterizing the power of sale as a
type of foreclosure); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26 (characterizing the power of sale
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2. Mortgage Foreclosure
Foreclosure is a proceeding that terminates the consumer’s interest in
property, either transferring title or forcing a sale, in order to satisfy the
debt.117 There are two primary types of foreclosures: judicial and
nonjudicial.118 While some courts do not distinguish between judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosures,119 several cases argue that the FDCPA applies to
judicial but not nonjudicial foreclosure.120
a. Judicial Foreclosure
Judicial foreclosure is the most utilized method of foreclosure.121 Every
state has a procedure for judicial foreclosure,122 and many states only use
judicial foreclosure.123 As the name implies, to initiate a judicial
foreclosure a creditor or his representative must file an action in court to
foreclose on the mortgaged property.124 The process is time consuming and
costly to creditors, but it allows a neutral judge to oversee the seizure.125
The creditor or third-party agent must serve a complaint on the consumer
who may then assert defenses.126
Once the court determines that the mortgage is valid and that there are no
procedural or substantive defenses, the court calculates the balance owed on
the debt.127 If the balance is not paid, then the court enters a final
judgment, the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, and the proceeds are
as distinct from foreclosure); see also infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of types of
foreclosure.
117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 99, at 719; 4 POWELL, supra note 104,
§ 37.36; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26.
118. See JOHN RAO ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES § 4.2.1 (3d ed.
2010). There is also strict foreclosure, which vests title with the creditor without a sale or
deficiency judgment, but this is only used in three states. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104,
§ 37.43; see also SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–26 (listing strict foreclosure as one of
three methods of foreclosure, and indicating that it is a type of judicial foreclosure).
119. See, e.g., Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 F. App’x 458 (11th Cir.
2009); Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg,
P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006).
120. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Bank of N.Y., No. 08-cv-00205-PAB-BNB, 2009 WL
3162153, at *8–9 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2009) (noting distinction); Maynard v. Bryan W.
Cannon, P.C., 650 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1141 (D. Utah 2008) (noting distinction); McDaniel v.
South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004) (distinguishing the
judicial foreclosure in the present case from other cases involving nonjudicial foreclosure).
121. BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128.
122. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.1.
123. See RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2.
124. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2.
125. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419–20; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128.
126. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32. This is a simplification of the
procedure, which, for the purposes of this Note, is sufficient. For a more detailed look at the
procedure involved in judicial foreclosure, see BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 419–20; 4
POWELL, supra note 104, §§ 37.37–41; and SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 128–29.
127. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32. The creditor must prove ownership
of the mortgage or note, and establish standing. RAO ET AL., supra note 118, §§ 4.2.2,
4.2.2.3.
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used to satisfy the debt.128 Typically the consumer retains possession of the
property until the sale, after which point the consumer must vacate.129 If
the sale’s proceeds do not satisfy the debt in full, then the creditor may seek
a personal deficiency judgment against the consumer.130
There are two distinct types of judicial foreclosure: strict foreclosure and
executory process. Strict foreclosure is available in only three states,131 and
is the transfer of title without a sale.132 Executory process—which is only
used in Louisiana133—is an expedited in rem134 procedure where there is no
personal judgment entered against the consumer.135 Instead, a deficiency
judgment may be obtained after appraisal.136
b. Nonjudicial Foreclosure
In addition to judicial foreclosure, a majority of states and the District of
Columbia allow power of sale foreclosure—also called nonjudicial
foreclosure.137 For nonjudicial foreclosure, a power of sale provision in the
mortgage or deed of trust allows the creditor to proceed to a foreclosure sale
without judicial action.138 Upon default, instead of filing a civil action in
court, the creditor gives notice to the consumer139 and initiates a foreclosure
sale140 after a period of time set by state statute.141 A court will only

128. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.2.
129. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 32 (indicating that a creditor can obtain a
writ that entitles her to a sheriff’s assistance in putting the creditor in possession).
130. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 127. However, some states do not allow
deficiency judgments. Id. If the sale generates more proceeds than the debt owed, the
surplus goes to the debtor. Id. at 127–28.
131. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43; see also SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 125–
26.
132. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 130; see also
supra note 118 and accompanying text.
133. See A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 48
B.C. L. REV. 851, 868 (2007).
134. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 864 (“Involving or determining the
status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing.”).
135. See Paul S. Ottinger, Enforcement of Real Mortgages by Executory Process, 51 LA.
L. REV. 87, 92–95 (1990); Overby, supra note 133, at 870.
136. See Ottinger, supra note 135, at 92; Overby, supra note 133, at 870 n.82.
137. See RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.3; see also BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at
421 (contrasting the nonjudicial method, which lacks judicial supervision, with the judicial
supervision that accompanies judicial foreclosure); LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at
34 (indicating that the power of sale is accomplished without filing a lawsuit); 4 POWELL,
supra note 104, § 37.42[1] (referring to power of sale foreclosure as a “non-judicial
alternative” to judicial foreclosure).
138. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at
34; RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.4.
139. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.42[4]. The creditor must (1) notify the
defendant of the intent to foreclose and include information regarding the debt and details of
the mortgage; and (2) provide notice of the proposed sale. See id.
140. See 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.43[5] (indicating that a public sale is often
required).

2012]

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND THE FDCPA

301

become involved if the consumer files for an injunction.142 Therefore,
nonjudicial foreclosure offers less protection to the consumer, but is quicker
and less expensive for the creditor.143 Where the power of sale is in a deed
of trust rather than a mortgage, the trustee—not the creditor—provides the
notice and executes the sale.144 After the sale, some states allow for a
deficiency judgment against the consumer.145
C. Mortgage Foreclosure and the FDCPA
Three clauses within the FDCPA—the security enforcer clause, the
fiduciary obligation clause, and the judicial venue clause—have special
importance when dealing with mortgage foreclosure. This section will look
at each in turn.
1. The Security Enforcer Clause
The FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” includes the following
clause: “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also
includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement
of security interests.”146 The non-binding FTC Staff Commentary suggests
that security enforcers—who “do not otherwise fall within the definition” of
debt collector—are only subject to the FDCPA covers when they take
nonjudicial action on security interests.147
The security enforcer clause has divided courts over the impact of the
FDCPA on security enforcers.148 In particular, this clause has been central

141. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421 (indicating that advertising may also be
required by statute); LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (discussing California’s
power of sale law); RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.4; SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 131.
142. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34 (discussing the ways a power for sale
foreclosure may end up in court); RAO ET AL., supra note 118, § 4.2.3.
143. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at
34; 4 POWELL, supra note 104, § 37.42[1] (indicating that power of sale is “widely used” and
is the “preferred approach” where it is available because of the cost and time savings). But
see RAO ET AL., supra note 118, §§ 4.2.3, 4.4.3 (discussing procedural requirements provided
by statute to protect consumers, such as recording chain of title and limiting those who may
use the procedures); SCHMUDDE, supra note 99, at 131 (noting some state provisions are
meant to protect consumers, such as the requirement of appraisals).
144. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 100, at 421; LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at
34.
145. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 99, at 34; 4 POWELL, supra note 104,
§ 37.42[6].
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006).
147. FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988).
148. Compare Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that the security enforcer clause includes—rather than excludes—security enforcers
in the definition of “debt collector”), with Jordan v. Kent Recovery Servs., Inc., 731 F. Supp.
652, 657–58 (D. Del. 1990) (distinguishing security enforcement from debt collection
because with security enforcement there is a present right to the property); see also Marshall,
supra note 7, at 1275–81.
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to judicial analysis149 and scholarly commentary150 regarding whether
persons foreclosing on a mortgage or deed of trust are debt collectors under
the FDCPA. Some courts have distinguished between judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. They reason that because judicial
foreclosure often involves a deficiency judgment against the person, it is
distinct from merely foreclosing on property through nonjudicial
foreclosure.151
2. The Fiduciary Obligation Clause
The definition of “debt collector” includes the following exception: “any
person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a
bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement.”152 The
FTC Staff Commentary provides that a trustee appointed solely to conduct a
foreclosure sale does not fall under this exemption.153 The few courts to
address this issue in the context of mortgage foreclosures have cited the
FTC Staff Commentary to conclude that foreclosing trustees are not entitled
to the exemption because debt collection activity is central—not
incidental—to their fiduciary obligation.154
3. The Judicial Venue Clause
The final clause at issue is the judicial venue clause. It provides that a
debt collector must bring an action to enforce an interest in real property in
the judicial district where the property is located.155 One circuit found that
149. Compare Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (“Security
enforcement activities fall outside the scope of the FDCPA because they aren’t debt
collection practices.”), with Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992)
(finding that the security enforcer clause does not limit, but rather enlarges, the category of
debt collectors).
150. See Griffith, supra note 24, at 77–78; Marshall, supra note 7, at 1298–1300
(analyzing the clause and concluding that it is “broader” than the definition of “debt
collector”).
151. See Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb.
9, 2005) (noting that the additional activity of pursuing a personal judgment qualifies as debt
collection); McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004)
(finding that “collecting money from a consumer” and “enforcing an interest in real
property” are distinguishable).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(i) (2006). The accompanying Senate Report indicates that
this provision was meant to exempt “trust departments, escrow companies, or other bona fide
fiduciaries.” S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698.
153. FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,103 (Dec. 13, 1988).
154. See Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2006);
Thomson v. Prof’l Foreclosure Corp. of Wash., No. 98-CS-478, 2000 WL 34335866, at *7
(E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2000); see also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028,
1034–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson and applying its reasoning to a student loan).
155. § 1692i(a)(1); S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 8, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1702 (“Actions on real
property are required to be brought in the judicial district in which the property is located.”);
FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. at 50,109 (clarifying that a debt collector can only
bring an action based on the location of a consumer’s real property when that action is to
enforce an interest in that real property).
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this clause would be superfluous if the FDCPA excluded foreclosure
attorneys or trustees from the definition of debt collector.156 Other courts
that have discussed this clause have not had occasion to decide its
implications on security enforcers, because the enforcers’ activities were
nonjudicial.157
II. A HOUSE DIVIDED: COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER THE FDCPA
COVERS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Part II of this Note discusses the split that has emerged among circuits
addressing whether mortgage enforcers are debt collectors under the
FDCPA. Part II.A looks at the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which found that
the FDCPA extends to mortgage foreclosure. Part II.B then turns to the
Eleventh Circuit, which held that mortgage foreclosure is not debt
collection under the FDCPA. Finally, Part II.C examines the Tenth Circuit,
in addressed the issue without resolving it.
A. The FDCPA Covers Mortgage Foreclosure
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits were the first to address the issue. Their
analysis in Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C.,158 and Kaltenbach v.
Richards,159 will be addressed in turn.
1. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth
divided panel
violations in
analyzed both
clause.163

Circuit first addressed the issue in Wilson.160 There, a
held that a law firm could be held liable for FDCPA
connection with initiating a foreclosure.161 The panel
the security enforcer clause162 and the fiduciary obligation

156. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that
“§ 1692i(a)(1) would be without effect” unless the FDCPA covered security enforcers that
also met the definition of “debt collector”). But see Fouche’ v. Shapiro & Massey L.L.P.,
575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787–88 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (finding that the defendant was only a debt
collector for the purposes of § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a)); Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278.
157. See Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007
WL 2695795, at *3 n.3 (D. Minn. Sept. 12, 2007); Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM,
2005 WL 300060, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 9, 2005). But see Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 788
(finding that a security enforcer who does not otherwise meet the definition of “debt
collector” is still subject to § 1692f(6) and § 1692i(a) of the FDCPA).
158. 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006).
159. 464 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006).
160. The Fourth Circuit had previously affirmed a lower court’s holding that
distinguished between debt collection and mortgage foreclosure. See Heinemann v. Jim
Walter Homes, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 716, 722 (N.D. W. Va. 1998), aff’d 173 F.3d 850 (4th
Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). The Wilson court considered this distinction and
disagreed. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376.
161. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 377–78.
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The defendants were a law firm hired by a bank to foreclose on the
plaintiff’s home164 and an attorney at the firm who was substitute trustee for
the deed of trust.165 The defendants sent a letter to the plaintiff, informing
her that her mortgage payments were in default and that they intended to
initiate foreclosure proceedings.166 The letter also asserted that the lawyers
were not debt collectors, but indicated that the notice was an attempt to
collect a debt and was sent in compliance with the FDCPA.167 The plaintiff
disputed the debt and requested verification in writing.168 The defendants
then initiated foreclosure proceedings in court.169
Although contacted by the plaintiff’s attorney, the defendants sent a letter
directly to the plaintiff to inform her of the foreclosure proceeding.170 The
plaintiff’s attorney requested a full statement of the plaintiff’s account.171
The defendants sent a letter directly to the plaintiff indicating the balance
owed on the mortgage and the amount owed to avoid foreclosure.172
The plaintiff resolved the dispute with the bank and the foreclosure
action was dismissed.173 The plaintiff then sued the defendants for
violating the FDCPA.174 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants because it held that trustees foreclosing on property are not
debt collectors, and are therefore outside the scope of the FDCPA.175 On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants’ demand for money placed
the defendants under the FDCPA,176 while the defendants argued that they
fell outside the FDCPA.177
164. See id. at 374; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392); Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392).
165. See Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392).
166. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374; Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
167. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 374–75. The letter also provided the amount owed, the
identity of the creditor, and the way to validate the debt. See id.
168. See id. at 375; Brief of Appellees at 1, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392).
169. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
170. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
171. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
172. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373
(No. 05-1392) (indicating that the letter contained a demand for money to reinstate the
account); Brief of Appellees at 2, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392).
173. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief of Appellees at 3, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
174. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375 (indicating that the action was brought for failure to
verify the debt, failure to cease collection efforts after the debt was disputed, and for
communicating directly with the plaintiff when it was known that she was represented by
counsel); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (indicating
that the action was brought under § 1692g(b) and § 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA).
175. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373
(No. 05-1392).
176. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8–9, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392)
(arguing that the purpose of the foreclosure activity was to collect a debt); see also Reply
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 5–6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (framing the
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The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Wilson focused on whether the defendant
law firm was a debt collector.178 However, before reaching a conclusion, it
first looked to the threshold requirement of whether a debt existed.179 It
then considered and rejected the distinction offered in Hulse v. Ocwen
Federal Bank, FSB180 between foreclosure and the collection of funds.181
Instead, the court concluded that the character of the debt remained
unchanged throughout the foreclosure proceedings.182 Otherwise, the court
concluded, debt collectors could exploit a loophole in the FDCPA that
exempted secured debts from its protection when debt collectors used
foreclosure.183 Thus, the court concluded there was a debt and that the
defendant tried to collect it.184
Next, the court disagreed with the defendants’ defense that they were not
debt collectors.185 The court rejected their first argument that they fell
under the fiduciary obligation exception.186 The court held that the
defendants were trustees, but that they were not entitled to the exception
defendants’ actions as “a law firm demanding money from a consumer,” and highlighting the
demand for money in the letter). There is a subtle difference here: the plaintiff’s brief cited
an analysis of the defendants’ foreclosure activity to demonstrate that the typical outcome
was payment to avoid foreclosure, but her reply brief focused on the demand for payment in
the letter sent to her. Compare Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No.
05-1392), with Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, 5–6, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 051392).
177. See Brief of Appellees at 5–16, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392) (arguing that as
trustees under state law, they fell under the fiduciary obligation clause, and that, because
their primary business was security enforcement, they fell under the security enforcer clause
and were therefore only subject to § 1692f(6)). The defendants also argued that they sent the
letters to accommodate the plaintiff’s verification request, not to collect a debt. See id. at 15.
Therefore, the defendants argued that foreclosure was not debt collection because it was
terminating a property interest rather than enforcing an obligation to pay money. See Wilson,
443 F.3d at 376; Brief of Appellees at 5–7, Wilson, 443 F.3d 373 (No. 05-1392).
178. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 375–77 (concluding that trustees acting in connection with a
foreclosure can be debt collectors); see also id. at 379 (remanding for consideration of
whether the firm’s principal business is debt collection, or if it regularly engages in the
collection of debts).
179. See id. at 375–77; see also Wymer v. Huntington Bank Charleston, N.A., No. 3:100865, 2011 WL 5526314, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 14, 2011).
180. 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002).
181. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (distinguishing
between foreclosure and debt collection, because the action concerned in the former is the
power of sale, not an attempt to collect funds).
182. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Wymer, 2011 WL 5526314, at *8.
183. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 376; see also Marshall, supra note 7, at 1276.
184. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377. However, one should note—as a potentially
distinguishing characteristic—that the defendant also made demands for money after the
foreclosure proceeding began. See id. at 376–77; see also Blagogee v. Equity Trs., LLC, No.
1:10-CV-13 (GBL-IDD), 2010 WL 2933963, at *5–6 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2010)
(distinguishing Wilson and finding that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to support
an FDCPA claim, because the defendant did not expressly demand payment). Wilson
argued in her reply brief that the demand for payment in the letter put the defendant squarely
within the FDCPA. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
185. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377 (rejecting the defendant’s fiduciary obligation
argument); id. at 378 (rejecting the defendant’s security enforcer argument).
186. See id.
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because foreclosure is central—not incidental—to the trustee’s fiduciary
obligation.187 It cited the FTC Staff Commentary as persuasive on this
point.188 It also rejected the idea that lawyers are fiduciaries under the
FDCPA because that would render the Supreme Court’s holding in Heintz
meaningless.189
Similarly, the court rejected the defendants’ security enforcer
argument.190 The court cited Jordan v. Kent Recovery Services, Inc.191 to
support its conclusion that the security enforcer clause “applies to those
whose only role in the debt collection process is the enforcement of a
security interest.”192 Thus, the court found that the clause includes those
who only enforce security interests for § 1692f(6) but does not exclude
security enforcers whose primary purpose is debt collection or who
regularly collect debts.193 Ultimately, the court held that the defendants fell
within the FDCPA.194
However, the dissent noted that defendants were fiduciaries because they
were trustees for the purposes of foreclosure.195 It then criticized the
majority’s “incidental” and “central” distinction as illogical.196 It also
suggested that it was improper to defer to the FTC Staff Commentary
because it conflicted with the text of the statute and its legislative history,
and was therefore not entitled to deference.197 The dissent did not address
the security enforcer clause.198

187. See id. at 377; see also Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1034–35
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson and reaching the same conclusion for a guaranty agency that
attempted to collect a student loan because the statute “exclude[s] fiduciaries whose sole or
primary function is to collect a debt on behalf of the entity to whom the fiduciary obligation
is owed”).
188. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 377.
189. Id. 377–78 (concluding that lawyers are generally fiduciaries for clients, and that
reading attorneys into the fiduciary obligation exception would be inconsistent with Heintz).
190. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378.
191. 731 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1990).
192. Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378. However, the court in Jordan also concluded that seeking
to recover a car through repossession was not seeking payment of the debt. Jordan, 731 F.
Supp at 659–60. This conclusion conflicts with Wilson’s holding regarding mortgages and
debt. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
193. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378; Marshall, supra note 7, at 1276–77.
194. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378–79.
195. See id. at 380 (Widener, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (“If the exception covers the minor unintended acts relating to incidental
fiduciary duties, it must cover the principal acts as well.”); see also Pizan v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. C11-26Z, 2011 WL 2531104, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2011) (noting the
dissent’s rejection of this distinction).
197. See Wilson, 443 F.3d at 380–81 (Widener, J., dissenting) (noting the FTC Staff
Commentary’s own limiting language, and that other courts have declined to give it Chevron
deference). The dissent also noted that the majority did not find that the defendants were
appointed solely to foreclose, as the Staff Commentary suggested. See id. at 380 n.3.
198. See id. at 379–81.
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2. The Fifth Circuit
In Kaltenbach, the Fifth Circuit also held that mortgage foreclosure could
be covered under the FDCPA.199 The panel examined the security enforcer
clause200 as well as the judicial district clause,201 but did not consider the
fiduciary obligation clause.202
The plaintiff secured a loan with a mortgage on a mobile home.203 After
missing payments, the mortgage company notified the plaintiff that it might
exercise its right to repossess the home and hired the defendant to initiate an
executory process foreclosure.204 Defendant initiated the foreclosure action
in state court, and the home was seized and sold to satisfy the plaintiff’s
debt.205 The plaintiff sued for failure to send a notice of debt validation
pursuant to § 1692g of the FDCPA,206 and the district court dismissed the
claim based on the security enforcer clause.207 The court considered and
rejected the analysis of McDaniel v. South & Associates, P.C.,208 which had
distinguished between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures.209 Instead, the
district court reasoned that § 1692f(6) only applies to nonjudicial action,
and differentiated the judicial action taken by the defendant.210
199. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that an
entity satisfying the definition of “debt collector” falls under the FDCPA even if enforcing
security interests).
200. See id. at 527–28.
201. See id. at 528.
202. See id. at 527–29. This argument does not appear to have been raised by either party
or the district court. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, No. 04-CV-65, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1
(M.D. La. Dec. 22, 2004) (summarizing the parties’ arguments). The plaintiff focused his
argument on Heintz and that the defendant was an attorney, but did not squarely address the
security enforcer clause. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Dismissal
at 2–6, Kaltenbach, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1, 2004 WL 3723010; Second Supplemental
Memorandum in Support Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3–4,
Kaltenbach, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1, 2004 WL 3723012 (discussing the defendant’s security
enforcer argument, but reframing the issue as a distinction between “[b]anks collecting their
own debts to attorneys foreclosing on a security interest”). The crux of the defendant’s
argument was that he fell under the security enforcer clause and was thus exempt from the
FDCPA. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3–5, No. 04-CV-65-C-m1,
2004 WL 3723009.
203. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526.
204. See id.; see also supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (discussing executor
process foreclosure).
205. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526; Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1.
206. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 526 (referring to the defendant’s failure to send a
“dunning” letter); Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *1.
207. See Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at *2–3 (finding that security enforcers are only
debt collectors under § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA).
208. 325 F. Supp. 2d. 1210 (D. Kan. 2004).
209. See McDaniel, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1216–18 (distinguishing cases that found
nonjudicial foreclosure fell outside the FDCPA from the instant case that involved judicial
foreclosure, because the judicial foreclosure involves a personal judgment to collect the
money owed); see also Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at * 3.
210. See Kaltenbach, 2004 WL 5573414, at * 3; see also supra notes 133–36 and
accompanying text (characterizing executory process as a type of judicial foreclosure). But
see Fouche’ v. Shapiro & Massey L.L.P., 575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 785–86 (S.D. Miss. 2008)
(characterizing the executory process as nonjudicial).
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit’s sole inquiry was whether the defendant was
a debt collector under the FDCPA.211 The court looked to Montgomery v.
Huntington Bank212 to conclude that security enforcers who do not meet the
definition of debt collectors are only covered under § 1692f(6).213 It
assumed for the sake of the appeal that the defendant otherwise met the
broader definition of debt collector.214 The court then gave Chevron
deference to the FTC Staff Commentary and concluded that the FDCPA
applies to a security enforcer who also meets the definition of “debt
collector.”215 It rejected the defendant’s argument that because his
interaction with the plaintiff was not the collection of a debt, but was rather
the enforcement of a security interest, it did not need to comply with the
FDCPA.216 The court relied on the text of the Act to support this
conclusion.217 Specifically, the court explained that the judicial venue
clause218 would be meaningless if security enforcers were exempt from the
broader FDCPA.219
The circuit court observed that other cases220 had concluded that security
enforcers are only subject to the FDCPA under § 1692f(6), but that these

211. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527.
212. 346 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2003).
213. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527; see also Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84.
However, the court in Montgomery did not make an express distinction between security
enforcers that do and do not otherwise meet the definition of debt collector. Montgomery,
346 F.3d at 700–01. Rather, the court flatly noted that security enforcers “d[id] not meet the
statutory definition of a debt collector” and that the plaintiff did not allege that the
repossession company principally or regularly collected debts. Id. It is unclear how it might
have affected the court’s analysis if the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant was a debt
collector. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit used Montgomery to support a conclusion
opposite to that of the Fifth. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
214. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527; see also id. at 529 (remanding for further
consideration the question of whether the defendant satisfied the definition of “debt
collector”).
215. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28; see also Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d
450, 456 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that Kaltenbach’s deference was based on Fifth Circuit
precedent that requires more deference). But see Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278 (indicating
that deference was based on persuasiveness). For a discussion of Chevron in the context of
the Staff Commentary see supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
216. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28. Other courts have held similarly. See, e.g.,
Boles v. Moss Codilis, LLP, No. SA-10-CV-1003-XR, 2011 WL 2618791, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
July 1, 2011) (noting that a security enforcer may be liable under the FDCPA if it meets the
“general definition of a debt collector”).
217. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 527–28; see also Marshall, supra note 8, at 1276
(indicating that statutory interpretation is an important step used by courts to ascertain
whether foreclosure is debt collection).
218. Under this section, a debt collector must bring an action to enforce a real property
interest in the jurisdiction in which the property is located. See § 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(1)
(2006).
219. Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528; see also Marshall, supra note 7, at 1278.
220. The court cited Hulse, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002), and Rosado v. Taylor,
324 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ind. 2004), as well as other cases. In Rosado the court found that
“[s]ecurity enforcement activities fall outside the scope of the FDCPA because they aren’t
debt collection practices.” Rosado, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 924. However, it distinguished
between sending an FDCPA notice on the one hand (subject to the FDCPA), and sending the
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courts did not address the judicial venue clause.221 The court also
contrasted these cases with Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman,222 a case that
supports the proposition that if a security enforcer meets the broad
definition of debt collector she is subject to the whole of the FDCPA.223
Further, the Fifth Circuit distinguished “general” and “specific” debt
collection activities.224 General debt collection refers to an individual’s
primary purpose or regular activity—it defines the individual.225 Specific
debt collection refers to the specific communication or interaction—the
action or inaction—between the person attempting to collect the debt226 and
the consumer.227 Although the court did not decide whether the
enforcement of a security interest in a particular instance was a
“communication” under the FDCPA,228 it noted that this was a separate
issue from whether the party was a debt collector.229 Thus, the court
concluded that the defendant could be a debt collector under the FDCPA if
he satisfied the general definition of debt collector, but remanded the case
to the district court to decide whether the defendant met the general
definition.230
In Brown v. Morris,231 the Fifth Circuit clarified that a foreclosing
enforcer, standing alone, is not a per se debt collector; rather, the enforcer
must also meet the general definition of debt collector.232 In evaluating the

summons and complaint for the foreclosure action on the other (not subject to the FDCPA).
Id. at 925–26.
221. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528 (noting the inability to reconcile a reading of the
security enforcer clause that excludes security enforcers from the definition of “debt
collector” and § 1692i, which “is directed at persons enforcing security interests”).
222. 823 P.2d 120 (Colo. 1992).
223. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528. In Zartman, the court was dealing with a claim
under § 1692i. Zartman, 823 P.2d at 122. It found that the security enforcement clause
broadened the definition of debt collectors for § 1692f(6) and that “any person who qualifies
under the first sentence in the definition [of debt collector] is a debt collector” under the
FDCPA. Id. at 124–25.
224. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528–29 (rejecting the idea that an entity enforcing a
security interest in a particular instance was not a debt collector); see also Memmott v.
OneWest Bank, FSB, No. 10-3042-CL, 2011 WL 1560985, at *9 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2011),
adopted as modified, 2011 WL 1559298 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2011); Fouche’ v. Shapiro &
Massey L.L.P., 575 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784 (S.D. Miss. 2008); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty,
LLP, No. 1:07-cv-0274-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2007).
This Note adopts this distinction in Part III.
225. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 528–29; Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84.
226. This roundabout way of saying debt collector is deliberate—not everyone who
communicates with a consumer regarding a debt meets the statutory definition of debt
collector.
227. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529 & n.5.
228. See id. (declining to express an opinion); Overton, 2007 WL 2413026, at *6.
229. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529; Overton, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4, *6.
230. See Kaltenbach, 464 F.3d at 529.
231. Brown v. Morris, 243 F. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2007).
232. Morris, 243 F. App’x at 35; Memmott v. OneWest Bank, FSB, No. 10-3042-CL,
2011 WL 1560985, at *10 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2011), adopted as modified, 2011 WL 1559298
(D. Or. Apr. 25, 2011).
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general definition of debt collector, the court considers the volume and
frequency of the defendant’s debt-collection efforts.233
B. The FDCPA Does Not Cover Mortgage Foreclosure: The Eleventh
Circuit’s Approach
In two separate cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that mortgage
foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA. More recently, however, it
determined that a demand for payment ancillary to a foreclosure proceeding
is debt collection.
Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.234 was the first circuit case to
hold that the foreclosure process was not debt collection under the
FDCPA.235 In Warren, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the fiduciary
exception, but rather relied on the security enforcer clause.236 It found that
the clause exempts the enforcement of security interests from being
considered “debt collection.”237
The plaintiff brought an action under § 1692g(b) of the FDCPA for the
defendant’s failure to verify the plaintiff’s debt before proceeding with
foreclosure.238 The court framed its analysis around the absent definition of
“debt collection.”239 It concluded that foreclosing on a security interest is
not debt collection because a security enforcer is not a “debt collector.”240
It relied on a canon of statutory interpretation—expressio unius est exclusio
alterius241—to hold that the inclusion of a security enforcer in one
provision implied its exclusion in the other provisions.242 The court cited to
cases supporting this proposition without noting or distinguishing contrary
authority.243
In Ausar-El ex rel. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of America) Home Loans
Servicing LP,244 the court came to the same conclusion without referencing
233. Morris, 243 F. App’x at 35; Fouche’, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
234. 342 F. App’x 458 (11th Cir. 2009).
235. Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460–61 (finding that the security enforcer clause exempts
security enforcers from the FDCPA except for § 1692f(6)); see also Hasbun v. Recontrust
Co., No. 11-60488-CIV., 2011 WL 3837158, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2011).
236. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460–61.
237. See id. at 460–61.
238. See id. at 459.
239. See id. at 460 (“[T]he FDCPA does not define ‘debt collection.’”); see also Kabir v.
Statebridge Co., No. 1:11-cv-2747-WSD, 2011 WL 4500050, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27,
2011).
240. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460 (holding that because a security enforcer is
included in the definition of “debt collector” for the purposes of § 1692f(6), it is not a debt
collector for other provisions of the FDCPA).
241. “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 99, at 661–62; see also Warren, 342 F.
App’x at 460.
242. See Warren, 342 F. App’x at 460.
243. See id. at 460–61. The court cited to Montgomery to reach a conclusion contrary to
the Fifth Circuit, which cited Montgomery for the same proposition. See supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
244. 448 F. App’x 1 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Warren, Kaltenbach, or Wilson.245 The plaintiff in Ausar-El defaulted on a
loan secured by a mortgage, and the defendant initiated foreclosure.246 The
plaintiff sued failure to comply with § 1692g’s verification requirement.247
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.248
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused its analysis on the definition of
debt collector and the security enforcer clause.249 It again relied on the
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius250 to conclude that security
enforcers are only debt collectors for the purposes of § 1629f(6).251
In May 2012, the Eleventh Circuit again addressed foreclosures and the
FDCPA in Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP.252 The court
did reference Ausar-El or Warren, but did address Wilson.253 Unlike
Ausar-El and Warren, Reese did not address whether a security enforcer
could be a debt collector under the FDCPA.254 Rather, the court limited its
analysis to a letter sent that contained both a demand for payment of a
promissory note.255 Like Wilson, the court avoided finding a “loophole” in
the FDCPA, which would have exempted security enforcers regardless of
whether their actions could independently constitute debt collection.256 The
court held that a communication can have a “dual purpose”: it can serve as
both a foreclosure notice and a demand for payment.257 Although the
245. See id. The court did, however, find support from Montgomery. Id. at 2.
246. See id. at 1.
247. See id. at 2 (noting that the lower court found that the defendant was not a debt
collector).
248. See id.
249. See id.; see also Comer v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:11-CV-88 (CDL),
2011 WL 5878400, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2011) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit
“follow[ed] the language of the statute”).
250. See supra note 241 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-327-MEF, 2011 WL 5358576, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011)
(noting that the Ausar-El court relied on the doctrine).
251. Ausar-El, 448 F. App’x at 2–3; see also Jackson, 2011 WL 5358576, at *3.
252. 678 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012).
253. See id. at 1218.
254. See id. at 1218 n.3 (“[W]e do not reach the question of whether enforcing a security
interest is itself debt-collection activity covered by the [FDCPA]. That is, we do not decide
whether a party enforcing a security interest without demanding payment on the underlying
debt is attempting to collect a debt within the meaning of § 1692e.”).
255. See id. at 1214–17.
256. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which found it problematic that secured debt would be
exempt under the FDCPA, the Eleventh Circuit found it untenable to exempt
communications that served the dual purpose of debt collection and security enforcement.
Compare Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the loophole as “immunizing any debt from coverage if that debt happened to be
secured by a real property interest and foreclosure proceedings were used to collect the
debt”), with Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18 (characterizing the loophole as “exempt[ing] from
the provisions of § 1692e any communication that attempts to enforce a security interest
regardless of whether it also attempst to collect the underlying debt”).
257. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18 (“A communication related to debt collection does not
become unrelated to debt collection simply because it also relates to the enforcement of a
secuirity interest.”); see also Birster v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 11-13574,
2012 WL 2913786, at *4 (11th Cir. July 18, 2012) (“[A]n entity can both enforce a security
interest and collect a debt . . . .”).
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Eleventh Circuit has walked back its inoculation of security enforcers,258 by
not addressing security enforcement it remains the only circuit to find that
the FDCPA does not cover mortgage foreclosure.
C. The Tenth Circuit Provides Further Analysis
In Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C.,259 the Tenth Circuit addressed in
dicta whether mortgage foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA.260 Although
it resolved the case on other grounds,261 it provided analysis of the interplay
between security enforcers and debt collectors under the FDCPA.262
A creditor hired the defendant to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure on the
plaintiff’s home and designated the defendant trustee of the deed.263 The
defendant recorded a notice of default and mailed it to the plaintiff along
with an FDCPA notice—including the mini-Miranda warning and the right
to dispute the debt.264 The plaintiff disputed the debt and requested
information about the mortgage.265 The defendant sent the information he
had regarding the mortgage to the plaintiff and forwarded the plaintiff’s
request for more information to the creditor.266
The plaintiff responded that this was inadequate, and that she needed her
present balance and payment history.267 The creditor then instructed the
defendant not to reach out to the plaintiff because the creditor was dealing
directly with her; the defendant took no further action on the foreclosure.268
Eventually, the plaintiff and the creditor reached an agreement to pay off

258. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217–18.
259. 401 F. App’x 389 (10th Cir. 2010).
260. See id. at 395 (assuming that nonjudicial foreclosure is covered by the FDCPA and
noting that it would not resolve the issue).
261. See id. at 398 (holding that the notice and letter at issue did not violate the FDCPA);
Huckfeldt v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 10–cv–01072-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL
4502036, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011).
262. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 393–95. (examining the definition of “debt collector”
and the meaning of “debt collection” under the FDCPA); Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at
*5 (noting Maynard’s “framing of the issue is helpful to [the] resolution of the issue”).
263. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 391–92; Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C., 650 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (D. Utah 2008) (noting that the defendant was appointed as the trustee
but was not asked to collect money).
264. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (indicating that this was “presumably in an effort
to comply with FDCPA requirements for debt collectors”); Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at
1140 (the notice indicated the principal secured debt, the cause of the default—failure to
make monthly payments—and foreclosure costs); see also supra notes 139–41 and
accompanying text.
265. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392; Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
266. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (noting that there was no demand for payment);
Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
267. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (observing that the plaintiff replied); Maynard,
650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
268. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392 (noting that the defendant had no further
communication with the plaintiff); Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41.
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the mortgage, and the foreclosure action was cancelled.269 The plaintiff
brought an action under the FDCPA claiming that the notice of default was
a third-party communication,270 and that the defendant failed to cease its
debt collection activity upon the plaintiff’s demand for verification.271
The district court noted the split in cases applying the FDCPA to
foreclosure actions.272 It also examined the application of the security
enforcer clause and highlighted the tension between the limited approach
taken by the Sixth Circuit in Montgomery, and the expansive approach
taken by the Fifth Circuit in Kaltenbach.273 The court found that the
defendant was only a debt collector for the purposes of § 1692f(6), because
he was only enforcing a security interest through nonjudicial foreclosure.274
Ultimately, the court concluded that even if the defendant was subject to the
FDCPA, it did not violate the Act as a matter of law.275
On appeal, the defendant conceded it was a debt collector under the
FDCPA, and that it had provided notices as if the Act applied to it.276 Thus,
the court focused on whether the foreclosure action was debt collection.277
Although it found that a mortgage is itself a debt, it distinguished the
payment of money from the sale of property in nonjudicial foreclosure.278
It noted that other cases—such as Wilson—applied the FDCPA to mortgage
foreclosures that also involved actions, such as demands for payment, that
were “indisputably debt collection activity.”279
269. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 392–93; Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (noting
the foreclosure was cancelled when the defendant was notified approximately two months
after the settlement).
270. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006).
271. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; see also § 1692g(b).
272. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1141–42 (discussing how courts have distinguished
judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures, and reached different conclusions regarding the nature
of security interests).
273. See id. at 1142 (reading Montgomery as excluding security enforcers from the term
“debt collector,” and Kaltenbach as including them).
274. See id. (noting that the defendant was only hired for the “limited purpose” of
foreclosure, and that there was no evidence of the frequency of his debt collection practices).
The court distinguished another Tenth Circuit case, Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda,
L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2006), because it dealt with a judicial foreclosure that
demanded a money judgment and attorney’s fees, while Maynard dealt with the enforcement
of a security interest where there was no agreement to collect money. See Maynard, 650 F.
Supp. 2d at 1143. The court also concluded that the defendant did not violate the FDCPA as
a matter of law, even if it did fall under the definition of debt collector. See id. at 1142–45.
The court called the mailing of the FDCPA notice “problematic,” but found that the FDCPA
only requires the cessation of additional collection efforts—not the undoing of ongoing
foreclosure procedures. See id. at 1144. It also noted that the notice of default was required,
and that the plaintiff consented by signing the deed of trust. See id. at 1143.
275. See Maynard, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1144–45.
276. See Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C., 401 F. App’x 389, 393–94 (accepting this
admission “for purposes of this case”).
277. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394. The court also considered the notice and letter
sent to the plaintiff as outside the scope of its analysis on foreclosure. Id. at 395–98.
278. See id. at 394; Huckfeldt v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 10–cv–01072MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 4502036, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2011).
279. Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394.
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The Tenth Circuit also noted that some cases had distinguished
nonjudicial and judicial foreclosure, because judicial foreclosure involves a
personal judgment.280 For example, McDaniel found that because the
foreclosure at issue included a demand for personal judgment, the
foreclosure was an attempt to collect a debt, rather than a mere foreclosure
on the plaintiff’s interest in the property.281
The court then cited with approval the Seventh Circuit’s Gburek v. Litton
Loan Servicing LP282 to hold that a demand for payment is not required,
because the purpose of the letter controls—the inclusion of FDCPA
language is legally irrelevant.283 However, the Tenth Circuit ultimately did
not answer whether foreclosure was debt collection, because it determined
that the defendant’s communications with the plaintiff did not violate the
FDCPA.284
III. A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Part III attempts to resolve the conflict among the circuits. Part III.A
reevaluates the conflict and constructs a framework for analyzing FDCPA
cases, with particular emphasis given to those that involve mortgage
foreclosure. Finally, Part III.B suggests legislation to amend the FDCPA to
prevent some of the inconsistent results that would otherwise arise from a
strict reading of the current language in the FDCPA.
A. A Framework for Avoiding Confusion
One cause of the conflict is that courts do not consistently address the
same issues: while some have looked to whether a mortgage is a “debt,”285
others have focused on the definition of “debt collector”286 or debt
collection.287 In other words, courts have reached different answers
because they have asked different questions. A consistent framework is
therefore needed to reach fair results.
Many courts already implicitly apply this framework,288 and other courts
evaluating FDCPA claims could also easily utilize it. However, for
280. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 394–95; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4.
281. See McDaniel v. South & Assocs., P.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. Kan. 2004).
But see Beadle v. Haughey, No. Civ.04-272-SM, 2005 WL 300060, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb. 9,
2005) (distinguishing McDaniel because the defendant had not sought a personal judgment
against the plaintiff).
282. 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010).
283. Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 395; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4. Gburek
involved a letter inviting the plaintiff to discuss “foreclosure alternatives.” Gburek, 614 F.3d
at 386. The court rejected a brightline rule requiring an explicit payment demand in favor of
a “commonsense inquiry” that looked at different factors such as: (1) the relationship
between the parties; (2) “the purpose and context of the communications—viewed
objectively”; and (3) whether there is an explicit demand for payment. Id. at 384–85.
284. See Maynard, 401 F. App’x at 395–98; Huckfeldt, 2011 WL 4502306, at *4.
285. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 211, 249 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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mortgage foreclosure, this explicit framework is particularly useful to
untangle the interwoven definitions.289
The proposed framework is a three-threshold test290: First, there must be
an alleged debt.291 Second, the individual action or communication at issue
must involve a debt (i.e., specific debt collection). Third, the defendant
must be involved in general debt collection so that it meets the definition of
“debt collector.” This means the defendant must either (1) have debt
collection as the principal purpose of its business;292 or (2) regularly collect
(or attempt to collect) debts.293
1. A Mortgage Is a Debt
To reach the second and third thresholds, there must first be an alleged
debt.294 A mortgage, as a type of security interest, represents an obligation
to pay money.295 When a mortgage secures the purchase of a home,296 it
qualifies as a consumer debt, and therefore fits comfortably in the FDCPA’s
broad definition of debt.297 Thus, a home mortgage is a debt, and the three
cases involving the attorneys from the Introduction all involve a “debt” as
defined by the FDCPA.
2. A Communication or Action Regarding Mortgage Foreclosure Is
Specific Debt Collection
The second threshold concerns specific debt collection, which focuses on
the defined term “communication”298 and the phrase “in connection with
the collection of any debt.”299 Since “communication” is defined broadly
as the “conveying of information regarding a debt,” any communication
regarding a mortgage—a debt—satisfies the definition.
Although “debt collection” is not defined in the statute,300 absent
language to the contrary, it should be interpreted broadly to meet the
remedial purpose of the FDCPA.301 Although this phrase is similar to the
one used to define “debt collector” (i.e., general debt collection), there are
two distinctions. First, there is no language indicating that the specific debt

289. See supra notes 146–47, 224–32 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. However, if the mortgage is
securing a different type of loan that was not for personal, family, or household purposes, it
would not be a debt under the FDCPA.
298. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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collection may be “directly or indirectly” collected.302 This indicates that
specific debt collection must be direct. Second, there is no security enforcer
clause for specific debt collection. Thus, specific debt collection—
interpreted broadly to achieve the remedial purpose of the FDCPA—
includes actions taken in connection with mortgage foreclosure. This holds
true regardless of whether the foreclosure is judicial or nonjudicial, or
whether there is a demand for money.
Therefore, communications or actions regarding mortgage foreclosure
satisfy the second prong of the framework. Because the three attorneys
from the Introduction—Smith, Jones, and Rogers—all sent communications
in their attempts to mortgage debts, they satisfy the second threshold of the
framework.
3. An Entity Whose Principal Purpose Is Security Enforcement Is a
Debt Collector Only If It Also Regularly Collects Debts
The third and final threshold examines general debt collection. One of
two realities must hold true to satisfy this threshold: the entity must either
(1) have debt collection as its principal purpose; or (2) it must regularly
collect debts.
a. A Security Enforcer’s Principal Purpose Is Not Debt Collection
For general debt collection, an entity’s principal purpose is defined by a
high percentage or proportion of debt collection activity.303 In the case of
security enforcers, it appears as though their principal purpose is already
defined: the enforcement of security interests. Therefore, their principal
purpose cannot be the collection of debts.304 Smith, Jones, and Rogers—
the three attorneys from the Introduction—fail to satisfy this prong of the
third threshold, because their principal purpose is the enforcement of
mortgages—a security interest—through foreclosure.
b. Whether a Security Enforcer Is a Debt Collector Depends on Whether It
Also Regularly Collects Debts
Although the attorneys do not satisfy the first prong of the third
threshold, they may still satisfy the second prong if they regularly collect
debts. This is determined by an examination of the volume and frequency
of the attorneys’ debt collection.305
Because general debt collection contains the security enforcer clause, this
suggests that the enforcement of security interests, such as a mortgage, is
not considered general debt collection. Thus, the rote enforcement of a
mortgage through foreclosure—including the mailing of a foreclosure
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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notice or the filing of a foreclosure action—does not qualify as general debt
collection. Since the attorney Smith only practices routine nonjudicial
foreclosure,306 he does not engage in general debt collection and is not a
debt collector under the FDCPA.
However, general debt collection can be satisfied when an attorney
moves beyond simple foreclosure to also demand money for the payment of
a debt. Thus, the mailing of demands for payment or the filing of a
deficiency judgment—either in conjunction with, or after the foreclosure—
could satisfy the general definition of debt collection if it were done with
sufficient frequency. Because attorney Jones consistently mails out a nontrivial amount of dunning letters to demand payment, he satisfies the second
prong of the third threshold and could therefore be a debt collector under
the FDCPA, so long as he does not fall within one of its exceptions. The
same is true for attorney Rogers, because of his consistent filing of
deficiency judgments, which are demands for payment to satisfy a debt.
It is worth noting, however, that none of the attorneys would be protected
by the fiduciary obligation exception.307 This clause does not cover
foreclosure trustees because they are not full trustees; rather their role is
limited to the enforcement of the deed of trust.308
B. Legislation to Achieve Consistent Results
Although the reading of the FDCPA proposed by this Note is consistent
with the Act’s text and purpose, it still reaches inconsistent results. While
attorneys Smith, Jones, and Rogers sent the same notice in connection with
the same type of proceeding, two of the attorneys fall under the FDCPA
because of their general debt collection activities, which are unrelated to the
specific debt collection.
In order to achieve consistent results, Congress should amend the
FDCPA to define “debt collection.” Congress could define the term so that
it clearly does not include the rote enforcement of security interests—such
as mortgages—but does include judicial or nonjudicial demands for
payment in conjunction with the enforcement. In this way, specific and
general debt collection would share the same definition. Thus, none of the
attorneys would fall under the FDCPA since their action—the mailing of a
notice of nonjudicial foreclosure—would not be specific debt collection
under the FDCPA. In the alternative, Congress could also define debt
collection to include the rote enforcement of security interests, so that
mortgage foreclosure would be both specific and general debt collection.
CONCLUSION
Courts should use this three-threshold framework to evaluate whether
defendants and their actions fall under the FDCPA. The framework
306. See supra notes 137–45 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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proposed by this Note looks at whether there is an alleged debt, and then
evaluates whether there are both specific and general attempts to collect a
debt. However, because this framework may lead to inconsistent results,
legislation is needed to clarify the definition of “debt collection.”

